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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Erik Sherman Trenkle appeals from his judgment of conviction for felony 
domestic violence in the presence of a child.  Trenkle contends the district court 
committed instructional error by denying his request for a defense of property 
instruction.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
The state charged Trenkle with domestic violence in the presence of a 
child for battering  in front of one of their children.  (R., pp.47-48, 56-57.)  
Prior to trial, Trenkle requested a “defense of property” instruction as set forth in 
ICJI 1522.  (R., pp.147-149.)  Trenkle’s requested instruction was premised on 
his assertion that he hit  to protect his phone.  (Trial Tr., p.266, L.15 – 
p.269, L.16.)  The district court denied Trenkle’s requested instruction because 
the evidence did not support the instruction.  (Trial Tr., p.269, Ls.19-23.)  At the 
conclusion of trial, the jury found Trenkle guilty.1  (R., pp.242, 265-266.)  The 
court imposed a unified 15-year sentence with four years fixed.  (R., pp.275-277.)  
Trenkle timely appealed.  (R., pp.280-282.)       
                                            
1 Trenkle’s first and second trials both ended in a mistrial.  (See R., p.226.) 
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ISSUE 
 
Trenkle states the issue on appeal as: 
 
 Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Trenkle’s request for an 
I.C.J.I. 1522 defense of property instruction? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.9.) 
 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Did the district court properly reject Trenkle’s request for a defense of 
property instruction since the evidence did not support such an instruction? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
The District Court Correctly Rejected Trenkle’s Request For A Defense Of 
Property Jury Instruction Because The Evidence Did Not Support It 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
 Trenkle asserts that the district court erred when it rejected his request for 
a defense of property instruction.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-14.)  Trenkle has 
failed to show error, however, because the district court correctly concluded the 
requested instruction was not supported by the evidence.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this 
Court exercises free review.  State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 
414, 430 (2009).  “An error in jury instructions only constitutes reversible error 
when the instruction misled the jury or prejudiced the party challenging the 
instruction.”  Id. (citation omitted).     
 
C. The District Court Correctly Rejected Trenkle’s Request For A Defense Of 
Property Instruction Because The Instruction Was Not Supported By The 
Evidence 
 
 “A trial court presiding over a criminal case must instruct the jury on all 
matters of law necessary for the jury’s information.”  State v. Severson, 147 
Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 414, 430 (2009) (citing I.C. § 19-2132).  “This 
necessarily includes instructions on the ‘nature and elements of the crime 
charged and the essential legal principles applicable to the evidence that has 
been admitted.’”  Id. (citing State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 172, 90 P.3d 920, 922 
(Ct. App. 2004)).  It also includes, when requested, instructions on “every 
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defense or theory of the defense having any support in the evidence.”  State v. 
Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 633, 38 P.3d 1285, 1289 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v. 
Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 328, 986 P.2d 346, 351 (Ct. App. 1999)).  Although 
“[e]ach party is entitled to request the delivery of specific instructions,” “such 
instructions will be given [only] if they are ‘correct and pertinent.’”  Severson, 147 
Idaho at 710, 215 P.3d at 430 (citing I.C. § 19-2132).  “A proposed instruction is 
not ‘correct and pertinent’ if it is (1) an erroneous statement of the law; (2) 
adequately covered by other instructions; or (3) ‘not supported by the facts of the 
case.’”  Severson, 147 Idaho at 710-11, 215 P.3d at 430-31 (citing State v. 
Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 285, 647 P.2d 734, 741 (1982)). 
 At trial, Trenkle requested a defense of property instruction, which was 
based on the theory that he was entitled to use force against  in order to 
protect his cellphone.  (Trial Tr., p.266, L.15 – p.269, L.16.)  The district court 
correctly concluded that the evidence did not support a defense of property 
instruction.   
 The pattern instruction for defense of property reads, in relevant part: 
 When conditions are present which under the law justify a 
person in using force in defense of . . . [property in the person’s 
lawful possession], that person may use such degree and extent of 
force as would appear to be reasonably necessary to prevent the 
threatened injury.  Reasonableness is to be judged from the 
viewpoint of a reasonable person placed in the same position and 
seeing and knowing what the defendant then saw and knew.  Any 
use of force beyond that limit is unjustified. 
  5 
(ICJI 1522 (brackets original).)2    
 
 Thus, in order to be entitled to a defense of property instruction, there had 
to be evidence that Trenkle had possession of the cellphone when he battered 
 and that the force he used was “reasonably necessary to prevent the 
threatened injury” to his cellphone.  The record supports the conclusion that there 
was no evidence of either.   
On the night Trenkle battered  was home with her three 
children when Trenkle came over at approximately 10:00 p.m. even though  
told him several times not to come over.  (Trial Tr., p.142, L.16 – p.143, L.13.)  
When Trenkle arrived, he said “that he was tired, wanted to crash out, and fell 
asleep on the couch” next to Misty’s and Trenkle’s young son.  (Trial Tr., p.144, 
L.15 – p.145, L.4.)  After Trenkle fell asleep,  “grabbed his cellphone and 
went looking through” it and found a “message to a girl asking to be friends with 
benefits.”  (Trial Tr., p.145, Ls.6-14.)  After  called and confronted the girl, 
she woke Trenkle up and confronted him, too, and told him to leave.  (Trial Tr., 
p.145, L.20 – p.146, L.10.)   and Trenkle argued for a few minutes, then 
Trenkle went into the bedroom where the couple’s other two children were 
sleeping, and went to bed.  (Trial Tr., p.146, Ls.12-21.)   continued to tell 
Trenkle to leave, but he refused.  (Trial Tr., p.146, L.19 – p.147, L.9.)  Because 
Trenkle would not leave,  grabbed Trenkle’s phone, which was in the room, 
and told Trenkle if he was not going to leave, she was going to throw his phone 
                                            
2 Idaho Code § 19-202 similarly provides, in pertinent part, that “Resistance 
sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by the party about to be injured . . . 
[t]o prevent an illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his lawful 
possession.” 
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“out the door.”  (Trial Tr., p.147, Ls.9-20.)   then “grab[bed] the phone,” “ran 
out the hallway out towards the front door, and opened up the door and tried to 
throw it out the door.”  (Trial Tr., p.147, Ls.21-25.)  As  started to throw 
Trenkle’s phone, he “pulled [her] back in from [her] shoulders,” and the two 
started “mutually fighting on the floor for the phone.”  (Trial Tr., p.147, L.25 – 
p.148, L.9.)   
  testified that, “[a]t some point, [she] felt it was getting out of hand,” 
so she “dropped the phone and told [Trenkle]” that she dropped the phone, and 
told him to “stop” and “get off [her].”  (Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.10-13; see also p.207, 
L.8 – p.208, L.22.)  Trenkle, however, “did not stop.”  (Trial Tr., p.148, L.14.)  
Instead, Trenkle “grabbed [her] around the neck” and “hit [her] on the top of the 
forehead” causing her to “los[e] consciousness for a couple of seconds.”  (Trial 
Tr., p.148, Ls.14-18, p.151, L.25 – p.152, L.6; see also p.211, Ls.4-8.)  When 
 “came to, [Trenkle] was standing over the top of [her],” so she kicked him 
until she “felt [she] had the opportunity to get up.”  (Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.19-24.)  
Trenkle’s attack caused injuries to Misty’s face, including a “goose egg” on her 
forehead, bruises under both eyes, and bruises on her arms.  (Exhibits 1-12; Trial 
Tr., p.214, L.19 – p.215, L.8.) 
Trenkle’s proposed defense of property instruction was not “correct and 
pertinent” because the cellphone was not in Trenkle’s possession when he first 
grabbed  and it was not in either Trenkle’s or Misty’s possession when 
Trenkle grabbed  around the neck or when he hit  in the forehead.  As 
such, Trenkle could not batter  in an attempt to get the phone back from 
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her, and he certainly was not entitled to batter her after she no longer had the 
phone.  Trenkle’s use of force was also not “reasonably necessary to prevent the 
threatened injury” to his cellphone.  Indeed, Trenkle did not have to use any force 
to prevent  from throwing his phone; he only had to leave as  asked 
him to do several times.  Even if Trenkle was not required to do that, it was not 
“reasonably necessary” to grab  around the neck or knock her out after she 
no longer had the phone – such acts would not even be necessary if  still 
had the phone in her possession.  The conclusion that Trenkle was not entitled to 
a defense of property instruction is consistent with the Court of Appeals’ opinion 
in State v. Walsh, 141 Idaho 870, 119 P.3d 645 (Ct. App. 2005). 
The Court described the facts in Walsh as follows: 
Walsh and the victim in this case were married.  The victim 
was contemplating divorce.  One morning while Walsh was in the 
shower, the victim removed a box of documents from Walsh’s 
vehicle that contained the couple’s tax documents and Walsh’s 
inheritance papers.  The victim hid the box from Walsh so that she 
would have the documents for an appointment with her divorce 
attorney.  Fearing that Walsh would be angry, the victim locked 
herself and her five-year-old son in a bedroom.  Upon discovering 
that the box was missing from his vehicle, Walsh pounded on the 
bedroom door, opened the locked door, and demanded to know 
where the box was.  The victim responded that it was in a safe 
place.  Walsh started to leave the room and the victim attempted to 
shut the door.  Walsh pushed the door open and called the victim a 
“bitch.”  Walsh then pushed the victim with both of his hands, which 
caused the victim to stumble back about four feet.  The victim 
called the police.  Walsh was arrested and charged with 
misdemeanor domestic battery in the presence of a child. 
 
Walsh, 141 Idaho at 872, 119 P.3d at 647.      
 Like Trenkle, Walsh asserted the trial court erred in declining his request 
for a defense of property instruction.  Walsh, 141 Idaho at 876, 119 P.3d at 651.  
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The Court of Appeals disagreed.  Id. at 877, 119 P.3d at 652.  In doing so, the 
Court first noted that, although a “person who lawfully possesses the property 
may use resistance sufficient to prevent the offense from occurring,” “[t]he 
offense about to be committed must be imminent and the defense is not available 
after the offense has already been completed.”  Id. (citing I.C. § 19-202 and State 
v. McNeil, 141 Idaho 383, 386, 109 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Ct. App. 2005)).  Applying 
the law to the evidence presented, the Court held the evidence did “not support 
the legal theory of defense of property” because, even assuming “the victim’s 
removal of the box of documents from Walsh’s vehicle was unlawful, Walsh’s 
actions could not be reasonably interpreted as resistance necessary to prevent 
an offense” because, “[a]t the time Walsh battered the victim, the box had 
already been removed from Walsh’s vehicle and Walsh did not know its location.”  
Walsh, 141 Idaho at 877, 119 P.3d at 652.  “Therefore, no resistance could have 
prevented an unlawful taking.  Further, no evidence suggests that there was an 
imminent threat that the victim would destroy the documents, which could justify 
resistance to prevent such injury.”  Id. 
 Since  had Trenkle’s phone in her possession before Trenkle 
battered her, “no resistance could have prevented an unlawful taking.”  Further, 
although Trenkle knew  had the phone, there was no “imminent threat” that 
she would “destroy” the cellphone if Trenkle left and there was certainly no 
imminent threat to Trenkle’s phone once  dropped it, told Trenkle as much, 
and asked him to get off of her.  Nevertheless, Trenkle continued to batter   
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As in Walsh, Trenkle was not entitled to a defense of property instruction based 
upon the facts of this case.     
Even if the trial court erred by not giving a defense of property instruction, 
Trenkle is incorrect in his assertion that the state cannot meet its burden of 
demonstrating such error was harmless.  An instructional error is harmless where 
it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the error.”  Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 
(1999); see also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010).   
Applying this standard to the facts of this case, this Court can easily 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that, had the jury been given the defense of 
property instruction, it still would have found Trenkle guilty for at least two 
reasons.  First, as noted, Trenkle’s acts were not reasonably necessary to 
prevent the threatened harm to his cellphone.  Second, Trenkle’s conduct after 
he battered  revealed that his violent acts were not to protect his phone, but 
were the result of rage.  After Trenkle eventually left Misty’s home,  had the 
locks changed.  (Trial Tr., p.154, Ls.5-16.)  Undeterred, Trenkle came back and 
removed the door from the hinges and, once inside, he put a picture of Johnny 
Cash giving “the bird” in their son’s swing so  would see it when she came 
home.  (Trial Tr., p.163, L.19 – p.165, L.5.)  Trenkle also told different versions of 
what transpired, neither of which included any claim that he was only trying to 
“defend” his cellphone.  Trenkle told the investigating detective that  was 
injured when he stuck his arm out as she was “pile driving” him in the bedroom 
and  hit her face on his fist.  (Trial Tr., p.251, Ls.3-25.)  Trenkle later told his 
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mother that he was going to “own” what he did, but then suggested that  
was injured because their son “head-butted” her.  (Exhibits 13, 14.)  Given the 
totality of the evidence, even if the district court had given the defense of property 
instruction, it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have 
found the defendant guilty.”  Neder, 527 U.S. at 18. 
Trenkle has failed to show any error in the district court’s determination 
that he was not entitled to a defense of property instruction.  Even if the court 
erred, the error was harmless.     
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Trenkle’s conviction 
and sentence.  
 DATED this 13th day of April, 2016. 
 
 
 
      /s/ Lori A. Fleming_________________ 
      for JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 13th day of April, 2016, served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an 
electronic copy to: 
 
 BEN P. McGREEVY 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address:  briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
      /s/ Lori A. Fleming_________________ 
      for JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
JML/dd 
 
 
